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GENETIC PRIVACY: 
THE POTENTIAL FOR GENETIC 
DISCRIMINATION IN INSURANCE 
Pamela Jensen * 
Beware of geneticists bearing discoveries.  Their findings, perhaps more than any others in 
science, are likely to be abused and harmfully misinterpreted in the future…blue­eyed 
'designer babies'…are not the real danger…Look instead at insurance companies…[t]hat is 
where the trouble is brewing. 1 
This thought­provoking quotation highlights the impact of the explosion in genetic technology 
which has occurred over the past decade.  The threat of modern genetics has been perceived as 
coming, rather dramatically, from genetic engineering, but the less flashy field of medical genetic 
testing poses significant and immediate issues. 2 Those issues are addressed in this paper. 
I INTRODUCTION 
Medical genetics increasingly presents the possibility of making predictive genetic 
diagnoses in healthy persons by identifying genes that may dispose to or lead to illness in 
later life.  For diseases that are preventable or treatable that is a decided benefit to the 
individual, but identification of an increased risk of becoming affected with a disorder 
that is not preventable or treatable offers new dilemmas. 
* This is an edited version of a paper submitted in fulfilment of the VUW LLB(Hons) legal writing 
requirement. 
1 A Gottlieb  "Are Your Genes Up to Scratch?" The World in 1991 (1990) 18. 
2 The terms "genetic testing" and "genetic screening" are often used interchangeably, although there 
is a difference between: (1) testing an individual for a condition suggested by evidence such as 
clinical signs and symptoms and/or family history; and (2) screening an individual of a 
population for a genetic defect without prior evidence of its existence in the individual.  Both 
terms are used in this paper, and context should assist the reader.
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One of the most pressing concerns is the potential for breach of confidentiality or 
invasion of privacy.   In analysing privacy issues the extent and circumstances in which it 
is appropriate to invade the privacy of another must be considered.  There are three parts 
to this question: the acquisition of information, the disclosure of information, and the 
potential for prejudicial use of that information by third parties. 3 A breach of privacy can 
result in an economic harm if a person is refused insurance on the basis of genetic test 
results. 
Policy makers must consider whether genetic test results are to be regarded as an 
extension of general medical information to be made available in similar circumstances, 
or whether they should they be treated as a new class of information, subject to a 
different set of considerations.  The law must be able to respond to concerns about the 
potential abuse of genetic information by third parties such as insurers. It will be 
important to balance the valuable research and medical information becoming available 
against the potential for discrimination. 
Legislative responses to the important policy questions concerning the privacy and 
control of genetic information have not kept pace with the recent rapid advances in 
medical science and technology, so that inadequate protection is afforded to genetic 
privacy in the present environment. 
II GENETIC INFORMATION: PRIVACY, CONFIDENTIALITY, AND 
DISCLOSURE TO THIRD PARTIES 
A Is Genetic Information Any Different From Other Medical Information? 
One of the most important questions to be considered is whether genetic information 
is merely one form of medical information, or whether it is so different from other 
clinical data that it deserves special legal protection.  There is precedent for this. Society 
traditionally accords a special level of protection to psychiatric records and to sexual 
health information, particularly HIV test results. Public perceptions also have a 
significant impact on this question.  An individual's genetic makeup is generally 
considered to be different from other medical information for a number of reasons. 
Without doubt, the fact that genetic information is both predictive and familial causes the 
greatest concern. 4 Information gained from genetic tests may predict future risks for 
3 In this paper, references to "third party" and "third parties" do not refer to family members.  The 
terms refer, in particular, to those who seek to make commercial gain by discriminating against 
individuals on the basis of their genotype.  In this paper, the writer refers almost exclusively to 
insurance companies. 
4 D Chambers  "The Bowles Symposium on Genetic Technology and Underwriting" (1998) 14 On The 
Risk 2.
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healthy individuals, and can also reveal both present and future health information about 
biological relatives of the individual tested, in a way that no other medical information 
can. 
The United States Task Force on Health Records and Genetic Privacy 5 has emphasised 
the importance of giving special protection to genetic information, even if that involves 
doctors keeping genetic information separate from other patient information.  The ability 
to treat genetic information with special care depends on how well it can be separated 
from other clinical information.   In this paper,  genetic information is defined broadly to 
include results of genetic testing, along with information about inherited characteristics 
obtained from a family history 
Currently, genetic test results, along with other genetic information such as patient 
family history, will form part of a patient's medical record. An individual's right to 
privacy includes the right to control personal information, which includes the right to 
limit the collection, disclosure, and use of the personal information they have given to a 
medical practitioner. Medical confidentiality reflects the importance placed on this 
privacy and, for the reasons outlined above, genetic information is worthy of special 
protection. 
If doctors had no duty to keep personal information confidential, then people might 
refuse medical treatment or withhold information which could seriously affect their 
doctor's ability to correctly diagnose and treat them.  From a patient's perspective there is 
a very strong expectation that strict confidentiality will be kept in the doctor/patient 
relationship. Privacy and confidentiality are at the heart of the therapeutic relationship, 
with confidentiality an important tool for protecting privacy.  The obligation upon 
doctors not to disclose information about patients can be found in medical professional 
ethics, legislation and the common law. 6 
B Patient Confidentiality and Medical Professional Ethics 
The ethical conduct of health professionals is governed by  a range of ethical codes. 
The first is the Hippocratic Oath: 7 
Whatever in connection with my professional practice, or not in connection with it, I see or 
learn, in the life of a man, which ought not to be spoken abroad, I will not divulge, as 
reckoning that all such should be kept secret. 
5 Established in 1997 by the Commerce Committee of the United States House of Representatives. 
6 See generally David B Collins Medical Law in New Zealand (Brooker & Friend Ltd, Wellington, 
1992). 
7 Hippocratic Oath, Hippocrates, 5 BC.
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More recent codes have been developed to take into account modern ethical 
dilemmas. 8 The New Zealand Medical Association Council Code of Ethics 1989, states that 
all doctors have a responsibility to their patients to: 9 
Keep in confidence information derived from a patient, or from a colleague regarding a patient, 
and divulge it only with the permission of the patient except when the law requires otherwise. 
The position appears to be clear.  A doctor can only disclose information when 
permitted by a patient or required by law.  A practitioner who breaches this duty may be 
subject to Medical Disciplinary Tribunal proceedings. 
Traditionally, this duty of confidentiality owed by a health professional to a patient 
has provided an appropriate means by which personal health information has been kept 
secure.  In the case of genetic information, however, there is the potential for that duty of 
confidentiality to become strained. The realm of genetic testing and eligibility for health 
or life insurance cover gives rise to a potential displacement of both the traditional patient 
expectation of confidentiality and the duty of the practitioner to maintain it. 
Dr Joanne Dixon, Medical Geneticist 10 stated at the 1995 Privacy Issues Forum 
that: 
I have now had numerous requests for information about tests, results, and implications of a 
diagnosis for a patient.  These requests have occurred after patients have revealed testing as 
part of their application, or where information emerged in a doctor's report (with the patient, in 
one case, quite unaware of the proposed diagnosis). 
Her policy is to insist on written consent from the patient before any information is 
released. 11 A further example relevant in the context of genetic information privacy 
8 See generally the Declaration of Geneva 1948; the World Medical Association International Code 
of Ethics 1949, 1968 and 1983; The Declaration of Helsinki, 1964, 1975 and 1983; the Declaration of 
Oslo 1970 and 1983; the Declaration of Tokyo 1975; the Declaration of Lisbon 1981; and the 
Declaration of Venice 1983. 
9 The New Zealand Medical Association (NZMA) Code of Ethics 1989 endorses the international 
codes listed above n 13.  All of these codes sanction modern versions of the Hippocratic Oath. In 
addition, members of the New Zealand Medical Association also acknowledge the spirit of the 
World Medical Association Code of Ethics (1949, 1965, and 1983). 
10 Medical Geneticist, Central Regional Genetic Service; Director of the Cytogenetics and Molecular 
Genetics Laboratories, Capital Coast Health; Clinical Lecturer, Department of Pathology, 
Wellington School of Medicine. 
11 Dr Dixon also fields enquiries from the courts.  In relation to a custody dispute, one parent was at 
risk of a genetic condition.  In a criminal case a patient had apparently revealed in his own 
defence, that he had recently undergone pre­symptomatic testing for a genetic condition.
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occurs when a doctor is employed by an insurance company for the purpose of medically 
assessing applicants and the reimbursement claims of those already insured. 
The New Zealand Medical Association Code of Ethics 1989 states that a practitioner 
must "[o]nly enter a contract with an organisation if it will allow the maintenance of 
professional integrity." 12 It is reasonable to expect that a doctor employed by an 
insurance company would ensure that the person she is examining understands that the 
usual doctor/patient relationship does not exist, and that any information disclosed will 
be recorded on a person's file.  Less clear is the intended application of the following 
requirements which appear under the heading "Responsibilities to Society:  Provision of 
Service in a Competitive Environment": 13 
47 Doctors must at all times regard their duty to a patient…, as overriding any loyalty to an 
employer… . In particular, doctors must not allow the commercial interests of an 
employer… to interfere with; 
… 
(a) the free exercise of clinical judgment in determining the best ways of meeting the 
needs of individual patients or the community[.] 
…
49 Standards of care should not be compromised in order to meet financial or commercial 
targets…set…by an organisation. 
These statements are instructive if they can be interpreted as applying to the role and 
duties of a doctor employed by an insurance company to conduct medical examinations 
or assess and verify claims.  It is hardly contentious to say that the insurance environment 
is competitive.  The fact that a doctor is required to place her duties to her patients over 
and above loyalty to her employer is good news indeed for insurance applicants and 
claimants. Finally, if an insurance company comes within the definition of "organisation", 
then a doctor is advised to allow standards of patient care to trump the company's 
financial or commercial targets.  Although ethical duties can be overridden  by the law, 
they are a sound platform on which to found an argument to support patient 
expectations within a clinical relationship. 
12 NZMA Code of Ethics, para 30 [Code of Ethics]. 
13 Code of Ethics above n 12, paras 47, and 49.
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C Patient Confidentiality and the Common Law 
Although there are common law exceptions to the duty on doctors to keep 
information about patients confidential, disclosure must not be made lightly or without 
good cause. 14 Legal decisions on confidentiality stress the important public interests 
served by respecting patient confidences.  As stated in the case of X v Y: 15 
…[i]n the long run, preservation of confidentiality is the only way of securing public health; 
otherwise doctors will be discredited as a source of  information, for future patients 'will not 
come forward if doctors are going to squeal on them'. 
D Patient Confidentiality and Medical Privilege in the Statutory  Context 
In New Zealand, the duty of confidentiality is formalised in a number of statutes 
which prohibit some health professionals from disclosing information about patients to 
third parties. 16 In  this context a further concept contributes to the relationship of 
confidence  between doctor and patient. 
Medical privilege is founded in section 32 of the Evidence Amendment Act (No 2) 
1980.  It can be defined as the immunity which some medical people have from 
disclosing in court proceedings "protected communications" from patients. 17 Relevant 
exceptions to this prohibition are where the patient consents to the information being 
divulged, or where the information was given in connection with the taking out of life 
insurance. 
The "insurance exception" found in section 32(2)(b) states that medical privilege does 
not attach to: 18 
The disclosure of any communication made to a registered medical practitioner in or about the 
effecting by any person of an insurance on the life of himself or any other person. 
When a person undergoes a medical examination by their own doctor pursuant to a 
life insurance application, insurance companies usually require applicants to waive 
14 See W v Edgell [1990] 1 All E R 835, 851: "[O]nly the most compelling circumstances would justify a 
doctor in acting in a way which would injure the immediate interests of his patient, as the patient 
perceives them, without his consent." 
15 X v Y [1988] 2 All ER 648, 653. 
16 Evidence Amendment Act (No 2) 1980; Hospitals Act 1957; Area Health Boards Act 1983. 
17 "Protected communication" means a communication made to a registered medical practitioner by 
a patient who believes that the communication is necessary to enable the registered medical 
practitioner to examine, treat, or act for the patient. 
18 Evidence Act (No 2) 1980, s 32(2)(b).
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medical privilege. The insurance exception also recognises that the person making the 
communication need not be a patient, as is the case when an insurance company arranges 
for a life insurance applicant to be medically examined by a doctor engaged by the 
company.  In this situation the doctor's employment contract with the insurer overrides 
the usual expectation of doctor/patient confidentiality. 
E Exceptions to the Duty of Confidentiality ­ When is Disclosure Justified? 
The concept of medical confidentiality is not inviolable. The law recognises that in 
some circumstances the interests of society may outweigh the desirability of maintaining 
medical confidentiality.  Most of these exceptions to the general rule are found in law, 19 
although there are some circumstances where ethical and moral demands require 
confidential information to be divulged. 20 It is important to note that ethical duties not to 
disclose information about patients can be overridden by any statutory or common law 
requirement to disclose such information. 
Under Rule 11(1)(b) of the Health Information Privacy Code 1994, specific exemptions 
apply where the patient gives written and valid consent to disclose particular 
information.  Insurance medical reports are common examples, and these are considered 
in a later part of this paper.  Individual practitioners are at risk when their employer 
seeks information which a patient/client may not have authorised.  It is important that a 
patient appreciates exactly which information she is authorising her doctor to disclose to 
a third party, along with any possible consequences of that disclosure.  Wherever 
possible a patient should be advised against consenting to a blanket authority.  A new 
consent should be given if further information is sought by the insurance company. 21 
F Concluding Comments 
The fact that genetic information is both predictive and familial means that it is 
worthy of special protection.  Just as recognition of the special nature of personal genetic 
information is an essential step towards protecting an individual's right to genetic 
privacy, it is also important to acknowledge the potential for the bounds of the traditional 
19 For example: Health Act 1956; Contraception, Sterilisation and Abortion Act 1977; Accident 
Rehabilitation and Compensation Insurance Act 1992; Civil Aviation Act 1990; Health Act 1956; 
Misuse of Drugs Act 1975;  Medicines Act 1981. 
20 Outside the ambit of this paper is the issue of the existence and application of a duty to warn 
blood relatives in respect of  genetic information. 
21 Subject to the accident compensation legislation, breaches of confidence could well be actionable 
in tort in New Zealand, so that a patient could claim damages.  Litigation is, however, expensive 
in terms of both time and money.
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doctor/patient relationship to become strained when negative economic consequences 
could flow from a breach of patient confidentiality. 
Genetic data must be particularly protected from third party interest and disclosure, 
as these data can be considered the core of an individual's person.  Genetic data should 
only be accessed by third parties in specific instances, and when the tested  individual has 
been completely informed of the usefulness and purpose of passing on the data, and has 
given written permission to release them.  In each individual case the doctor should 
consider whether the data is absolutely relevant to the question at hand and to the person 
seeking disclosure, and whether the patient is aware of all of the facts that may be relayed 
as well as the significance and possible consequences of relaying that information.  These 
obligations clearly go beyond the general concept of confidentiality in medical practice. 
III THE POTENTIAL FOR GENETIC DISCRIMINATION AND THE NEED 
FOR LEGAL PROTECTION OF GENETIC INFORMATION 
Genetic testing may reveal information which can be used to the benefit of an 
individual or to discriminate against an individual. 22 While literature furnishes rich 
examples of the uses and abuses of genetics 23 , history too offers up many repugnant 
examples of past abuses of genetics.  The very word "eugenics" conjures up images of 
Hitler's infamous "racial cleansing" and other atrocities which occurred under the guise of 
scientific advancement and social and economic salvation in Nazi Germany.  The United 
States has also, at various times in its history, dabbled in eugenics. 24 
For detractors inclined to suggest that eugenics is a thing of the past, it is sobering to 
read that China recently passed a eugenic law compelling all couples to undergo pre­ 
marriage testing for, among other things, serious hereditary diseases. 25 Individuals 
22 Information about a susceptibility to a particular disease or condition can enable an individual to 
make lifestyle and other decisions which may decrease their chance of developing the condition. 
Alternatively,  the same information could result in the individual being denied insurance cover. 
23 For example: HG Wells The Island of Doctor Moreau (1896) and Aldous Huxley Brave New World 
(1932). 
24 The Supreme Court in Buck v Bell 256 US 689 (1927) held that eugenics by involuntary sterilisation 
of the mentally subnormal was constitutionally acceptable.  In the early 1970's, legislation was 
enacted to mandate screening for the sickle cell trait in blacks applying for marriage licences.  The 
debacle resulted in some insurers basing their decisions on test results.  As recently as 1988, the 
United States Office of Technology Assessment suggested that human mating should not proceed 
without the use of genetic data, and that carriers of defective genes should use non­natural 
insemination strategies. 
25 Article 10, Law on Maternal and Infant Health Care 1995 (as cited in Statement on the New Chinese 
Law Concerning Maternal and Child Health Care, Committee for Public Relations and Ethical Issues of
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suffering from, or carrying the gene for, any hereditary disease must be sterilised or agree 
to long­term contraception.  All pregnancies are to be screened, and abortion is 
mandatory if the pregnancy is affected by genetic disease or other congenital defect. 
In liberal democracies such as New Zealands, the new eugenics is bound to be much 
more subtle, working through the market rather than the state.  It will be founded on the 
new medical paradigm that every major disease has a genetic component and that our 
likelihood of developing disease depends in part upon our genes.  It is also thought that 
susceptibility to environmental factors and infections is partly genetic.  People will 
increasingly come to think of good health as a matter of having healthy genes. Medical 
practice will increasingly involve gene management and manipulation. 
Society will be faced with ethical, moral and social dilemmas as it considers whether 
it would be irresponsible to deliberately bring a disabled child into the world. Although 
individuals will be faced with the eugenic decisions, the end result will be the same ­ an 
attempt to 'improve' the genes of the next generation.  Writers even now decry "the rise of 
a new eugenics" 26 which they describe as a product not of state policy, but of "social and 
institutional pressure". 27 
The greatest danger is perceived as coming from the use of predictive susceptibility or 
predisposition testing for multi­factorial diseases. 28 Genetic tests are still poor predictors 
when it comes to such conditions and many individuals who are carriers will never show 
manifestations of their genotype. 29 Modification of diet, exercise and lifestyle choices 
can, along with medical management, limit the expression of the gene.  Inaccuracy of 
testing and variable test interpretation exacerbate the potential for discrimination in the 
absence of adequate regulatory protection. 
'Genetic discrimination' may be defined as discrimination against an otherwise 
healthy individual on the basis of a genetic variation which may predispose her towards 
suffering from a disease or condition in the future.  It is unacceptable for discriminatory 
the German Society of Human Genetics) <http://omnibus.ruf.uni­freiburg.de/~gwolff/ 
e_china.htm>. 
26 D Nelkin and M S Lindee The DNA Mystique: The Gene as a Cultural Icon ( W H Freeman, New 
York, 1995.) 
27 Above n 26. 
28 Multi­factorial (also known as polygenic) diseases result from the additive effect of a number of 
factors, some genetic, others environmental or unknown.  This vast group of diseases includes 
most of the chronic diseases of later life. 
29 Genotype refers to an individual's genetic makeup as opposed to phenotype, which refers to the 
physical manifestation of an individual's genotype, as a result of interaction with the environment.
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practices to be based on immutable characteristics such as hair colour, race or sex.  Also 
to be avoided is the formation of a new social underclass based on genetic discrimination 
­ the asymptomatic or 'healthy ill' whose only abnormality lies in their genes.  The 
challenge is to anticipate the possible abuses of genetic information and to ensure that 
appropriate ethical and legal safeguards are set in place. 
IV COMMERCIAL APPLICATIONS OF GENETIC INFORMATION ­ 
GENETIC DISCRIMINATION IN INSURANCE 30 
A How Insurance Works and the Potential for Discrimination 
Genetic information provides serious challenges to the traditional operation of 
insurance.  Insurance is designed to provide financial protection against inescapable 
harms and unexpected loss, and is based on the concepts of risk­spreading and risk­ 
sharing.  When the future health risks of a group of people are unknown, the future 
health care costs of the group can be predicted on an aggregate, actuarial basis, and the 
costs spread across the whole group.   Life and health insurance in New Zealand are 
premised on the notion that risks can be predicted on a population­wide basis. 
Consequently some 95% of proposals are accepted on standard terms, 31 even though 
there is always a great variation in the likelihood of any particular individual making a 
claim against the insurer. 
Genetic technology, however, is making it possible to identify which people are likely 
to develop particular diseases at some time in the future, and insurance companies have 
begun to target them for individual assessment 32 and special treatment ­ higher rates or 
denial of coverage.  It is already accepted policy for health insurers to refuse to cover pre­ 
existing conditions, but predictive susceptibility genetic testing now provides an 
enormous loophole for insurers to classify numerous diseases or medical conditions as 
pre­existing when prospective insurance candidates carry a susceptibility gene. In the 
extreme, that approach could render everyone uninsurable as every human carries 
between 8 and 12 "defective" genes that might trigger various medical disorders. 33 
30 In this paper, "insurance" does not refer to real estate and chattels insurance, but refers instead to 
life,  health, and income and mortgage protection insurance. 
31 Errol Bateman, Insurance Underwriter, Royal & Sun Alliance Insurance (Telephone interview, 
Wellington, 12 August 1997). 
32 Household and motor vehicle insurance policies are individually assessed.  The term "proposer" 
refers to a person requesting insurance cover from an insurance agent, broker or company.  In this 
paper, "proposer" will be used interchangeably with the term "applicant". 
33 L Andrews  "Body Science" (1997) 83 ABAJ 44, 46.
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There is a silver lining to the cloud.  In the past an individual with, for example, a 
family history of Huntington's chorea, 34 would have been refused life insurance or 
charged a high premium even though no symptoms were present.  The insurer could not 
know if the individual would develop the disease but knew that there was a 50% chance 
of it happening.  Now that the test for the disease is almost 100% accurate, those with a 
family history of the disease can receive full insurance at standard rates if they test 
negative. 
On the other hand, an insurance applicant who has undergone genetic testing, and 
whose results indicate a high risk of prematurely suffering from a debilitating illness, or 
even dying, should not be permitted to anti­select against the insurer by taking out a very 
large policy.  "Anti­selection" or "adverse selection" occur when an individual contrives to 
gain an unreasonable benefit in return for premiums paid.  Other policyholders are 
eventually adversely affected when they are required to pay higher premiums to 
subsidise the high level of claims made by a member of the pool of individuals insured at 
standard rates. 
An interesting analogy can be made with car insurance.  Research shows that 
consumers agree with the notion that "people should pay different rates for car insurance 
based upon the degree of risk they represent to the insurance company".  But when the 
word "health" is substituted for "car" the consumer attitude is quite different. 35 But can 
that be fair, when an applicant has no control over his genetic makeup?  In order to be 
able to price insurance according to the risk, insurers simply need to know as much about 
the applicant's health history as the applicant knows.  They do not need to know more. 
Exclusions based on voluntarily assumed risks, such as cigarette smoking and 
hazardous pursuits, are perceived as somehow acceptable, but are less so when based on 
genetic differences.  The distinction which is drawn between factors which are a matter of 
choice and genetic characteristics over which a person has no control, is the basis for the 
argument that higher premiums should only be charged when there is an element of fault 
on the part of the insured, as in the car insurance example above. 
If, through the use of genetic information, insurers can learn of an individual's 
potential future health risks, such as a serious late­onset disorder, the benefits of risk­ 
34 Huntington's chorea, a monogenic disorder caused by a single gene mutation, is a slow wasting 
disease in which the patient's progressive mental and physical disability leads to involuntary 
movements, dementia and then premature death.  The disease is still incurable and if someone 
carries the gene they will get the disease, although they may be asymptomatic until they are aged 
50 or older. 
35 P Brockett  "Genetic Testing, Insurance Economics and Societal Responsibility" paper presented at 
the  Bowles Symposium, 1997.
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spreading will be lost.  Insurance companies would then be dealing more in certainties 
than in probabilities.  The ability to identify and exclude high risk individuals could 
result in the paradoxical situation of insurance being most readily and affordably 
available to those who need it least.  For individuals at risk, insurance may become 
prohibitively expensive.  Individuals may respond by refusing to be tested, for fear of 
becoming part of an uninsurable underclass.  A refusal to be tested is not desirable from 
either a personal or public health perspective.  A study at an American university has 
shown that: 36 
…[P]eople who are using genetic testing are losing their insurance.  And other people who 
should avail themselves of genetic testing are losing their lives to save their insurance. 
There is a tension between those individuals who wish to exercise their right to know 
their genetic makeup, yet keep that information private, and insurance companies which 
claim that individuals should not be entitled to deprive them of information that could 
impact on the company's commercial interests. 37 A further and even more complex 
tension is developing between individuals who do not wish to know their genetic 
makeup but still wish to be insured on standard terms, and insurers who may wish to 
gather more detailed medical information about an applicant via genetic testing. 
If an individual cannot buy insurance without taking a genetic test, that is, arguably, 
a coercive and unethical business practice.  Insurers are obliged to treat applicants and 
policyholders fairly.  Overarching these tensions is the inherent conflict in insurance. 
Both insurers and policy­holders seek to maximise their own returns.  That conflict 
notwithstanding, there is an obligation on both parties to act in utmost good faith when 
entering an insurance contract. 38 
B Concluding Comments 
A decision to be tested for genetic mutations should be made by an individual with 
the advice of their medical practitioner, and not at the suggestion or behest of an 
36 Nancy Wexler, Psychologist, Columbia University, New York.  Ms Wexler was a member of a team 
who identified the specific gene for Huntington's disease in 1993.  She believes that people have a 
right not to know their own genetic makeup.  Wexler herself has at a 50% risk of developing 
Huntington's ­ the disease which killed her mother. 
37 See also: Business Week Online News, 24 October 1996, 1.  A survey by Georgetown University 
scientists asked 332 people with genetic disorders in 44 states if they had encountered problems 
getting health or life insurance.  Some 25% said they were denied life insurance, while 22% were 
refused health insurance. It is outside the ambit of this paper to discuss the potential for genetic 
discriminatory practices  by employers educational institutions, courts, mortgage brokers, 
adoption agencies and the armed forces. 
38 The principle of uberrima fides, utmost good faith, is a legally accepted tenet of insurance.
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insurance underwriter.  The right to choose or refuse to undergo medical tests or 
procedures, after being presented with the risks, benefits and alternatives, is well 
established in both medical practice and law.  If insurers were able to insist that an 
applicant or policyholder undergo genetic testing, an unwilling applicant may receive 
knowledge that they or family members do not wish to have.  That would result in a loss 
of privacy and a potential loss of insurability, which is an economic loss. 
V WHAT CAN BE DONE TO SAFEGUARD INDIVIDUAL GENETIC 
PRIVACY AND PREVENT GENETIC DISCRIMINATION?: MODELS OF 
REGULATORY PROTECTION OF GENETIC INFORMATION 
A International strategies 
World­wide interest in, and reaction to the benefits and challenges of, the Human 
Genome Project (the "HGP") have resulted in a plethora of both international and 
national efforts to protect private genetic information by regulating its collection and use 
by insurance companies.  A recent World Health Organisation report describes two basic 
approaches to protecting genetic data from access by insurers: 39 
The first is to protect privacy by making access to information about an individual impossible, 
even with that individual's consent… . The second approach is to allow access to information 
but prevent it being used for a discriminatory purpose. 
A Preliminary Draft for a Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights 
states unequivocally that: "[T]he confidentiality of genetic data associated with  a named 
person…must be protected from disclosure to third parties". 40 Another article states 
that: 41 
No one may be subjected to discrimination based on genetic characteristics that is intended to 
diminish or has the effect of diminishing human dignity or impairing the right to be treated 
equally. 
In spite of this overall trend suggesting intervention to limit access by insurers, the 
fundamental question remains whether protection from third parties such as insurers 
39 D C Wertz  "Guidelines on Ethical Issues in Medical Genetics and the Provision of Genetic 
Services" (WHO, Geneva, 1995) 79, Recommendation 6. 
40 UNESCO "Revised Outline of a Declaration on the Protection of the Human Genome" 
(International Bioethics Committee, Paris, March 1996) Article 8; UNESCO "Preliminary Draft for a 
Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights" (International Bioethics 
Committee, USA, 1996) ["Protection of the Human Genome"]. 
41 "Protection of the Human Genome", above n 40, Art 7.
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should be through strengthened human rights legislation, heightened protection of 
medical records, or though a specific statute prohibiting genetic discrimination. 
B United States 
In the United States, where there is no universal health care system, the great concern 
is access to, and availability of, health insurance.   Some time ago, citizens realised that 
insurance companies and employers 42 could discriminate against them if their medical 
files contained evidence that they suffered from, or were predisposed to, costly diseases. 
State legislators and Members of Congress sprang into action with Bills to protect 
genetic privacy and prohibit genetic discrimination.  By 1997 at least 15 states had enacted 
genetic privacy laws.  More than 75 Bills are pending in more than 30 states, and several 
federal Bills have been introduced.  Much of the proposed state legislation has been 
eclipsed by a new federal law. 
The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 1996 (HIPAA) provides an 
important new protection for people who want to undergo genetic testing but fear 
discrimination by health insurers if test results indicate an increased risk of developing a 
serious disease.  It curtails the right of health insurers to limit coverage of apparently 
healthy applicants because of 'pre­existing conditions', including susceptibilities 
predicted by genetic tests.  Coverage cannot exclude conditions which may exist in the 
future. 43 This means that individuals who decide to undergo pre­predispositional 
genetic testing will face relatively little risk of discrimination in health insurance. 
C The European Community 
The major Community­wide initiative is a Commission of European Communities 
funded report by Euroscreen, 44 which is currently consulting with the insurance industry 
with a view to developing an agreed policy on the use of genetic information. 45 In the 
meantime, some European countries have taken independent legislative action to control 
the use of genetic information. 
42 Employers are relevant in the American environment, as a great proportion of the population 
receive health insurance cover as part of an employment contract. 
43 Section 101. 
44 Euroscreen "Genetic Screening: Ethical and Philosophical Perspectives" (February 1997). 
45 The next Euroscreen Report is expected to be released in 1999, and will address some of the major 
issues: (1)whether there is anything special about genetic information as opposed to other medical 
information; and (2) implications of genetic information for insurance companies.
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Norway has introduced statutory prohibitions to forbid the receipt, possession, or use 
of information concerning individuals which is derived from genetic test, as well as 
forbidding the release of medical information to insurers without consent. 46 Belgium 47 
has adopted laws to prevent insurers from requesting or using genetic information to 
underwrite life insurance contracts.  France and the Netherlands have adopted moratoria 
on access to genetic information by insurers. 
In the United Kingdom the Association of British Insurers (ABI) announced recently 
that people wishing to take out new life insurance will not be asked to take genetic tests 
when applying for life insurance. 48 Individual insurance companies will continue to 
decide whether applicants will be required to disclose the results of any genetic tests 
already undertaken. 
The ABI has also set up a Genetics Committee to liaise with geneticists and other 
relevant bodies, and consult with the public on a Code of Practice on genetic data.  The 
Code seeks to establish standards and guiding principles regarding the proper use of 
genetic information by insurers.  The Association intends to review the present position 
in 1999 in order to take current genetic developments into account. 
D Australia 
Comprehensive genetic privacy legislation has not been enacted in Australia, 
although the Privacy Commissioner has issued an information paper identifying 
problems in this arena. 49 Health insurers have been silent on the subject, whereas the 
Life Investment and Superannuation Association of Australia (LISA) has been proactive 
in releasing a special Code of Conduct in relation to the use of  genetic test results.  The 
Code suggests that insurers should be able to request existing genetic test results only 
with express written informed consent, and that results should only be used to classify 
the risk of the individual concerned, but not of other blood relatives. 50 
46 Act Relating to the Application of Biotechnology in Medicine 1994. 
47 Loi sur le Contrat d'Assurance Terrestre 1992. 
48 Association of British Insurers  "Life Insurance and Genetics ­ A Policy Statement" (London, 
February 1997). 
49 Privacy Commissioner of Australia, The Privacy Implications of Genetic Testing, Human Rights and 
Equal Opportunity Commission, September 1996. 
50 There is a real issue here which relates back to one of the factors which makes genetic information 
special, and deserving of special treatment and protections.  That issue is the familial nature of the 
information and the fact that information can be gleaned about other blood relatives from genetic 
test results from only one family member.
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VI PROTECTION OF GENETIC INFORMATION PRIVACY IN NEW 
ZEALAND 
A The Role of the Privacy Act 1993 and the Health Information Privacy Code 1994 
The government has a regulatory role to play in protecting consumers of genetic 
services by ensuring that genetic information is safely stored, with strict controls on its 
disclosure and use. 
The Privacy Act 1993 (the Act) starts from the premise of control by individuals of 
information about themselves.  The concept of privacy has evolved to include recognition 
of an individual's information profile and personal history.  The Act sets out the 
principles relating to the collection, storage, use and disclosure of any information about 
any individual.  The rules of the Health Information Privacy Code 1994 (the HIPC) apply, 
similarly, to health information. The overriding question is whether these principles and 
rules are sufficiently robust to govern genetic information. 
In the Act "personal information" is broadly defined as meaning "information about 
an identifiable individual". 51 In the HIPC "health information" 52 is defined as meaning 
information about an identifiable individual that is: 53 
(a) information about the health of that individual, including his or her medical history; 
information about any disabilities the individual has, or has had;… 
(c) information provided by that individual derived from the testing or examination of any 
body part, or any bodily substance of that individual; 
(d) information about that individual which is collected before or in the course of, an 
incidental to, the provision of any health service or disability service to that individual;… 
(i) an agency which provides health, disability or medical insurance, but only in respect of 
providing that insurance. 
Both "personal information" and "health information" are broad enough, therefore, to 
include the fact that a person has undergone genetic testing, any discussions that the 
person may have had about her genetic testing, and any information about the identity of 
her biological relatives.  The wide definition of "agency" in the Act applies to both public 
51 Section 2(1). 
52 Part I of the Code defines the scope of "health information" as that "information held by a health 
agency". 
53 It is interesting to note that the Alberta Freedom of Information and Privacy Act 1994 definition of 
"personal information" expressly includes "the individual's inheritable characteristics".
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and private sector persons or bodies which would include insurance companies.  In the 
HIPC, "health agencies" expressly includes health insurers. 54 
Personal information may be collected by an agency only where it is necessary for a 
lawful purpose connected with a function or activity of that agency. 55 A compelling case 
would have to be made in respect of genetic information.  The fact that it may be useful 
or relevant in the future would not satisfy this principle.  If an insurer were collecting 
genetic information in order to offer differential coverage or conditions to individuals 
with a defective genotype, and if this were to come within the prohibited grounds for 
discrimination under the Human Rights Act 1993, then this may not be a "lawful" 
purpose under Principle 1 of the Privacy Act. 
Agencies should collect personal information directly from the individual 
concerned, 56 but in the context of genetic testing, information about family members will 
be unavoidably obtained.  An exception in the HIPC permits collection of information 
from someone other than the individual, for the purposes of assembling a family or 
genetic history. 57 That is important as, for many genetic diseases, it may be necessary to 
test not just an individual but also other family members. 
When personal information is collected from an individual an agency must ensure, as 
far as practicable, that the individual concerned is aware of the fact that the information is 
being collected, the purpose for which the information is being collected, the intended 
recipients of the information, any consequences of not providing the information, and her 
rights of access to, and correction of, the information collected. 58 In the genetic testing 
context, adhering to these requirements is particularly important when an individual is 
applying for insurance and supplying a medical history, or when being examined or 
assessed by a doctor employed by the insurer. 
A significant safeguard in place is that information can only be used for the purposes 
for which it was collected or for directly related purposes. 59 That means that genetic 
information collected by a health insurer should not then be used when an individual 
seeks life insurance, even though the information may be held by the same agency.  The 
54 Part I, Rule 4(2)(j). 
55 Privacy Act 1993 ("Privacy Act"), Principle 1; Health Information Privacy Code 1994 ("HIPC") Rule 
1. 
56 Privacy Act, Principle 2; HIPC, Rule 2. 
57 HIPC, Rule 2 (2)(e). 
58 Privacy Act, Principle 3; HIPC, Rule 3. 
59 Privacy Act, Principle 10; HIPC, Rule 10.
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insurer should elicit a written authorisation for the information to be used, ensuring 
always that the insured is giving their fully informed consent to the collection and use of 
genetic information. This safeguard would also come into play if another blood relative 
were also insured by, or applied for insurance with, the same insurer as the person who 
has supplied genetic test results to the company. 
The information gleaned from the test results of the one individual, must not be used 
to assess the health status of another individual.  That is particularly important given the 
familial nature of genetic information.  There is no reason why this protection should be 
weakened by the "family or genetic history" exception mentioned above. 60 While an 
agency may not keep information longer than is required for the purposes for which it 
may be lawfully used, 61 the HIPC  allows information to kept for as long as it is required 
to provide the health service. 62 That could well mean that an insurer could justify the 
long­term retention of genetic test results. 
There are also limits placed upon the disclosure of personal or health information 
held by an agency.  The agency cannot disclose information unless the disclosure is either 
one of the purposes in connection with which the information was obtained, or is directly 
related to the purposes in connection with which the information was obtained. 63 
Disclosure is sanctioned if authorised by the individual concerned 64 or if it is to the 
individual concerned. 65 
The HIPC rule differs from the principle in the Act and, in particular, places 
considerable emphasis on eliciting authorisation from the individual concerned.  In the 
genetic testing and insurance context, the issue of the genuineness of the consent given 
must be considered.  There is a very real likelihood that disclosure of genetic test results 
could amount to coercion if applicants knew they would be denied insurance if they were 
to refuse to supply results, or even refuse to undergo genetic testing. 66 
60 HIPC, Rule 2(2)(e). 
61 Privacy Act, Principle 9. 
62 HIPC, Rule 9. 
63 Privacy Act, Principle 11; HIPC, Rule 11. 
64 Privacy Act, Principle 11 (d). 
65 Privacy Act, Principle 11 (c). 
66 As discussed in Part IVA.
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B Insurance Company Compliance with the Privacy Act and the Health Information 
Privacy Code 
Research into insurance company compliance with the Principles of the Privacy Act 
offered some interesting results.  It is commonplace for a health insurer to request further 
information before paying out on a reimbursement or other type of claim.  Typically, 
when such a report from a doctor is required, the insured patient is asked to take a report 
form, complete with a "privacy sign­off" to her doctor.  The GP completes the form and 
returns it to the company's medical referee. 
By way of comparison, the application for one life insurance policy goes even further, 
saying under the heading "Your Declaration and Privacy Act 1993 Acknowledgements": 67 
I authorise: 
(a) [the company] to obtain at any time from any employer, doctor, hospital, health agency, 
insurance office, government agency or any other person any information [the company] 
may require to perform, or complete any of the purposes in connection with which I have 
provided personal information to [the company]. 
(b) Any such person to release to [the company] any personal information the person holds 
concerning me. 
The problems associated with such blanket authorisations are considerable in the 
genetics context.  Many of the problems have already been raised and discussed, but it is 
important that members of the public are aware of the extent of the authorisation they are 
giving their insurers.  The Privacy Commissioner recently acknowledged that many 
doctors are concerned at the blanket authorisations used by some health insurers. 
Patients have no choice but to sign if they want their claims processed.  The 
Commissioner said: 68 
I am aware that some doctors consider that they have been presented with unreasonable 
requests for information…which does not seem relevant.  They  have wondered whether the 
patient anticipated what could be requested using the authorisation.  I think the concern about 
blanket authorisations is legitimate. 
The relevant principles are that disclosure must be revocable, and patients must be 
informed of this right to revoke.  Recipients of information must be notified that the 
67 Policy application supplied by a major New Zealand life insurance company. 
68 B Slane "Information Protection in Healthcare: Knowledge at What Price?"  Address by the Privacy 
Commissioner (Health Summit, July 1998).
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disclosed information is confidential, and the information must not be re­disclosed 
without the specific written consent of the patient. 
C Storage of Genetic Information 
At present, there is no national genetic register in New Zealand. 69 Testing samples 
are stored along with test results and analysis in the Cytogenetics Departments of public 
hospitals. 70 Test results are not recorded in current hospital­based computer 
programmes without written informed patient consent. 
D Concluding Comments 
Genetic privacy must be rigorously protected.  In respect of health care coverage it is 
recommended that: (1) information about past, present, or future health status, including 
genetic information, should not be used to deny health coverage or services to anyone; 
and that (2) access to health insurance cover should not depend on the disclosure by 
individuals or families of information, including genetic information about present, past, 
or future health status. 
The Privacy Commissioner has acknowledged that he is permitted under the Act to 
issue specific codes of practice which could modify the general information privacy 
principles in ways relevant to the problems posed by the collection, use, and disclosure of 
genetic information.  He has suggested though, that: 71 
it would be a matter of public policy as to whether or not that is appropriately done under 
delegated legislation by a Privacy Commissioner or whether the issues should be faced by our 
legislators in primary legislation by an act of the New Zealand Parliament. 
VII PROTECTION AGAINST GENETIC DISCRIMINATION: THE ROLE OF 
THE HUMAN RIGHTS ACT 1993 
The insurance industry tends to favour self­regulation over legislation, and New 
Zealand insurers have worked closely with the Human Rights Commission to prepare 
69 See J Dixon, J Winship and D Webster, Priorities for Genetic Services in New Zealand for the National 
Advisory Committee on Core Health and Disability Support Services,  July 1995. 
70 Currently, in New Zealand, there are only two specialist clinical geneticists, Dr Joanne Dixon, 
Central Regional Genetics Service and Dr J Winship, Northern Regional Genetics Service.  It is 
interesting to note that  Sexual Health Clinics which work out of hospitals also keep their encoded 
patient records separate from the hospital information system, in order to accord the highest 
possible security to such sensitive patient information. 
71 B Slane "Whose Genes Are They Anyway? The Use and Misuse of Human Genetic Information" 
(Health Research Council Conference, July 1995).
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industry guidelines based on the Human Rights Act 1993 (the "HRA"). 72 The HRA 
prohibits discrimination in the provision of  "goods, facilities or services to the public". 73 
As the term "facilities" expressly includes insurance, insurers cannot refuse to offer 
insurance, or treat persons less favourably, on the basis of  disability. 
The definition of "disability" within the HRA arguably covers the physical 
manifestation of any genetic defect and is potentially broad enough to include genetic 
carrier or susceptibility status in "[a]ny abnormality of… physiological, or anatomical 
structure or function". 74 
In addition, discrimination based on a person's family history and an assumed or 
suspected disability could also bring genetic predisposition within the parameters of the 
HRA. 75 In the interests of clarity and certainty, amending the HRA to remove any doubt 
that defective genes can cause illness or disease would be a progressive step. 
Although an insurer cannot refuse to insure on the basis that a genetic predisposition 
is a pre­existing condition, 76 the exclusion of a pre­existing condition does not contravene 
the HRA, as there is no refusal to insure nor any less favourable treatment.  Those who 
are already sick cannot be discriminated against because of the risk of future illness ­ they 
already have the illness. 77 Genetic testing warrants separate analysis in the guidelines, 
which state that, while insurance companies can request that existing genetic test results 
are made available for the purpose of classifying a risk, they cannot insist that applicants 
undergo genetic tests. 78 
In section 48, the HRA expressly permits insurers to rely on disability for the 
purposes of deciding the terms and conditions upon which a person is to be offered 
insurance. To come within the exemption, the differential treatment must be reasonable 
and based on actuarial or statistical data or, where none exists, on medical or actuarial 
72 Insurance Guidelines (Human Rights Commission, Auckland, 1997), prepared pursuant to s 5(1)(d) 
Human Rights Act 1993. 
73 Section 44. 
74 Section 21(h)(v), emphasis added. 
75 Section 21(2). 
76 A pre­existing condition is one that the proposer has at the time of application for insurance. 
77 United States legislation, the Americans with Disabilities Act 1990 has recently been amended to 
limit access to genetic information relating to actual conditions, whereas information about 
asymptomatic status cannot be used. 
78 At common law the insurance contract could be avoided for non­disclosure if genetic test results 
were not disclosed.
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advice or opinion. 79 Although there is as yet no consensus on the issues surrounding 
genetic testing in insurance, it seems that this provision effectively approves genetic 
discrimination in the provision of health and life insurance.  The provision must be re­ 
examined and, if necessary, amended to provide sufficient protection for individuals.  To 
date, the HRA remains untested in the area of genetic discrimination 
Obtaining adequate health insurance in a system becoming more and more 
dominated by private health insurance is crucial. 80 Giving a person the option of 
withholding the information from their medical record may reduce insurance 
discrimination but it may ultimately have a negative impact on that person's care. 
Broader solutions would be to improve the confidentiality laws governing all medical 
information, to prohibit health insurance discrimination against all pre­existing 
conditions and risks of future disease premised on genetic test results.  Another option is 
that the risk of genetic discrimination  could be reduced by insurers considering a 
moratorium on the use of genetic tests in underwriting. 
VIII CONCLUSION 
Developments in genetics are occurring at lightning speed.  Can the legal tortoise keep 
pace with the scientific hare?  Enacting genetic­specific legislation may be a poor option 
as good laws are difficult to make and hard to change.  Governments can do many things 
in addition to making laws.  They can educate the public, and establish advisory or 
supervisory machinery.  The respective Commissioners of Privacy and Human Rights are 
an integral part of the current supervisory machinery when considering issues related to 
genetic privacy and discrimination. 
New Zealand is not well­served in any coherent, universal way when ethical and legal 
aspects of the new human genetics require consideration.  To remedy this it is 
recommended that an advisory group 81 be set up whose terms of reference would be to: 
(1) monitor developments in human genetics; (2) facilitate discussion with all relevant 
persons, groups and bodies; and (3) report on issues arising from new developments in 
human genetics that can be expected to have wider ethical, social, economic, and legal 
consequences.  Those terms would include, for example, the insurance industry.  The 
79 Geoff Rashbrooke, Government Actuary, notes that his function is advisory only (Telephone 
interview, Wellington, July 1997). 
80 Dr Tim Smart, Executive Director, Health Insurance Association, suggests that some 37% of the 
New Zealand population (approximately 1.4 million), New Zealanders are covered by private 
health insurance policies.  Although this is an informal statistic, the number is significant. 
81 Possible members of the group would include: geneticists, medical ethicists, lawyers, and 
representatives from Human Rights Commission, Health and Disability Commissioner, Privacy 
Commissioner , Ministry of Health and the insurance industry.
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advisory group could also suggest ways of educating the public and increasing its 
understanding of the new genetics. 
Current law in New Zealand is not robust enough to adequately protect the privacy of 
personal genetic information.  It may not, however, be necessary to enact genetic­specific 
legislation.  The pros and cons of enacting genetic­specific legislation require further 
debate.  There may be, in the near future, a need for legal safeguards against compulsory 
genetic screening.  Although it may be argued, somewhat speciously, that insurance is 
not a compulsory undertaking, that fine line between permission, informed consent and 
coercion can easily become blurred. 
Legislators, insurance providers, and the public are starting to pay greater attention to 
issues surrounding the protection of genetic information.  Currently, the level of 
protection available in New Zealand is uncertain, and quite possibly inadequate.  Genetic 
information is of such a fundamentally different nature in its unique ability to identify, 
classify and differentiate a person, that it cannot always be treated as an extension of 
general medical information. Genetic information must be given special status in order to 
protect individual privacy, especially with respect to predictive genetic information. 
Without this special status there is a significant risk of harm, including discrimination in 
insurance. 
In the final analysis it is as well to recognise that: "each new power won by man is a 
power over man as well." 82 
82 CS Lewis The Abolition of Man (MacMillan, London, 1965) 71.
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